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Dignity and Justice for All
ARTHUR CHASKALSON*

―Dignity and Justice for All‖ is the theme of the year-long
celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Celebrating the Universal Declaration is also the
theme of this conference, and the title matches that theme. In the
context of that theme I have been invited to talk about human rights
in South Africa, which will be the focus of my remarks. The
Preamble to the Universal Declaration records that:
disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief, and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people.
It goes on to say that ―it is essential, if man is not to be compelled
to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.‖
This is a reference to the horror of the Second World War, to the
inhumanity of the Nazi regime and the repression it imposed within
Germany and the territories it occupied, and to the optimism in the
wake of that war, that there would be a better world. The vision of
the better world contemplated by the Universal Declaration is one in
which there would be social justice and respect for the inherent
dignity of all people: a world in which fundamental rights and
freedoms will be upheld by all nations. The same words would
appropriately describe the atmosphere in South Africa in 1994 when
* Chief Justice of South Africa (retired), and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law,
University of Maryland School of Law.
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a democratic constitutional state was established.
On May 10, 1994, President Nelson Mandela was sworn in as
South Africa’s first democratic President. Speaking to the nation, he
captured the spirit of the Universal Declaration’s preamble, saying:
We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in
which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to
walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their
inalienable right to human dignity—a rainbow nation at peace
with itself and the world.
....
Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful
land will again experience the oppression of one by
another . . . .1
Sixty years after the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, we can see how difficult it has been to realize the
aspirations expressed in the Declaration, to secure the universal and
effective recognition and observance of its provisions, by all U.N.
member states. That is an issue that will be addressed later during
this conference.
The Universal Declaration contemplates that everyone should
enjoy not only fundamental civil and political rights, but also
―economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his [or her]
dignity and the free development of his [or her] personality.‖2 Our
Constitution has similar provisions to which I will refer later.
Fourteen years after the establishment of a democratic constitutional
state in the place of the egregious apartheid state, although substantial
progress has been made towards establishing a legal order based on
the rule of law and respect for human rights, we in South Africa can
also see how difficult it is to achieve the social justice our Constitution contemplates.
To understand the difficulties that confront us in South Africa, it is
necessary to go back to our history. As a result of history, black
South Africans, the great majority of the population of South Africa,
were for all practical purposes denied the franchise in the land of
1. Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa, Inaugural Address (May 10, 1994),
available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1994/inaugpta.html.
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 22, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. See also id. arts. 23–27 (articulating social,
economic, and cultural rights).
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their birth. This was a privilege reserved for whites. In 1948, the
year in which the Universal Declaration was adopted, the white
voters of South Africa elected the National Party as their government.
The campaign slogan of the Nationalists had been ―apartheid,‖ which
literally meant separateness, but really meant white domination and
the subjugation of the black population.
Apartheid was the culmination of a process of white supremacy
which had been in place for three centuries. Throughout this period,
whites, who were a small minority of the population, used their
political and economic power to further their own interests, partly
through the manner in which they organized the society and allocated
its resources, and partly by the enactment of racially discriminatory
legislation. Under apartheid this process was deeply entrenched.
Apartheid became a powerful ideology, based on the false assumption that blacks were an inferior race. Apartheid was institutionalized
in the legal system and affected all aspects of life in South Africa.
Supremacy of Parliament
At that time, the doctrine of supremacy of parliament, a principle
of English law, later entrenched in the Republic of South Africa
Constitution of 1961, was applied by our courts. Its impact best can
be described by referring to a passage from a judgment of the
Appellate Division, where the then-Chief Justice said, ―Parliament
may make any encroachment it chooses upon the life, liberty, or
property of any individual subject to its sway . . . and it is the
function of the courts of law to enforce its will.‖3 This was done as a
matter of course under apartheid. Legislation could not be invalidated and, where it was interpreted in a manner which did not meet
the satisfaction of the government, the ―loophole‖ could be closed by
legislation. Law enforcement provided the means by which discrimination was kept in place and dissent was curtailed. This was done
through a draconian system of security legislation similar in many
respects to anti-terrorism measures we see in different parts of the
world today, which will be the subject of discussion in a later session
of this conference. Thus, the practice of parliamentary supremacy

3. Sachs v Minister of Justice 1934 A.D. 11 (A) at 37 (S. Afr.) (Stratford, C.J.), cited in
CORA HOEXTER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 12 (2007), and Kate O’Regan,
Breaking Ground: Some Thoughts on the Seismic Shift in our Administrative Law, 121 SALJ
424 (2004).
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drew judicial officers into the process of enforcing apartheid, a
legacy that still hangs over the courts.
The Universal Declaration warns that tyranny and oppression lead
ultimately to rebellion. This is what happened in South Africa.
Despite the massive power of the state, there was an ongoing and
intense struggle against apartheid fuelled largely by the frustrations
of its victims. Many died or were imprisoned during the course of
that struggle. Ultimately, the conflict was brought to an end by a
negotiated settlement.
The Constitutional Settlement
The settlement was recorded as ―a solemn pact‖ in an interim
Constitution which came into force in April 1994. It contained an
entrenched Bill of Rights, and a resolution on national unity and
reconciliation which formed part of the Constitution. The resolution
begins with a statement that:
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the
past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife,
conflict, untold suffering and injustice and a future founded on
the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful
coexistence and development of opportunities for all South
Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.4
The resolution goes on to stress the imperatives of unity and
reconciliation and the need to lay a firm foundation for the future in
order to transcend the divisions and strife of the past.
The interim Constitution made provision for the transition to
democracy to be completed in two stages. While there is no time to
discuss that process tonight, it is sufficient to say that it led to a new
democratic Constitution which came into force in February 1997.
The Founding Values
In the preamble to the Constitution, the injustice of the past is
acknowledged, and a commitment is made to improve the quality of
life of all citizens and to free the potential of each person. The
founding values of the new legal order are identified specifically in
4. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, epilogue (National Unity and Reconciliation). The
resolution is incorporated into and forms part of the present Constitution which was
proclaimed on December 18, 1996 and came into force on February 4, 1997.
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the Constitution.5 They are: human dignity; the achievement of
equality; the advancement of human rights and freedoms,6 including
non-sexism and non-racism;7 and respect for certain of the fundamental principles of democracy—the rule of law, universal adult
suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections, and a
multi-party system of democratic government to ensure accountability, responsiveness, and openness.8
The Impact of the Constitution
The Constitution does not simply remove apartheid laws and
sanitize the old legal order. It does much more than that. It demands
that our society be transformed from the closed, repressive, racial
oligarchy of the past, to an open society based on social justice and
these founding values—values which must now inform all aspects of
our legal order. These changes were, in truth, revolutionary.
The Circumstances Existing when the Constitution Was Adopted
At that time we were, and indeed still are, one of the most unequal
societies in the world. The past hung over us, profoundly affecting
the environment in which we were living. The great majority of
South Africans had been the victims of a system of racial discrimination and repression that had affected them deeply in almost all
aspects of their lives. This was seen most obviously in the disparities
of wealth and skills between those who had benefited from colonial
rule and apartheid, and those who had not. It was seen in the contrast
between those with land, and the millions of landless people; between
those with homes, and the millions without adequate housing;
between those living in comfort, and the millions without access to
adequate health facilities, clean water, or electricity; between those
with skills and secure occupations, and the millions who, as a result
of inferior education, lacked skills required for the professions or
managerial positions in commerce and industry, and were either
unemployed or had limited employment opportunities. The conflict
left in its wake a severely damaged economy, a fragmented and
traumatized society, widespread poverty and underdevelopment, and

5.
6.
7.
8.

These are entrenched in Chapter 1 of the Constitution. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 1.
Id. s. 1(a).
Id. s. 1(b).
Id. s. 1(d).
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corruption. It was in this environment that we adopted the new
constitutional order.
The Bill of Rights
The founding values are given substance in a bill of rights, which
is declared in the Constitution to be ―a cornerstone of democracy in
South Africa.‖9 It not only entrenches internationally recognized
civil and political rights and freedoms, but, consistent with the
Universal Declaration, also makes provision for socio-economic
rights.
The Courts
When the new constitutional order was introduced, the existing
courts, which had enforced apartheid, were retained, and the existing
judges and magistrates remained in office. One new court, the
Constitutional Court, was established. It was to be the highest court
in respect of all constitutional matters and its decisions on such
matters would be binding on all other courts. In my comments I will
focus on the role of this Court in developing the new constitutional
jurisprudence of our country, paying particular attention to concerns
of dignity and equality.
The New Constitutional Order
In contrast with the position of courts under apartheid, our courts
now have extensive powers. The exercise of public power, and in
many instances, private power, is subject to constitutional control.10
Courts are required to declare any law or conduct inconsistent with
the Constitution to be invalid to the extent of such inconsistency, 11
and the Constitution states explicitly that ―an order or decision issued
by a court binds all persons to whom and all organs of state to which
it applies.‖12
All lawmaking authority must be exercised in accordance with the

9. Id. s. 7(1).
10. Pharm. Mfr. Ass’n of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South
Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) paras. 40–45 (S. Afr.).
11. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 7(1) (―The Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in
South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic
values of human dignity, equality and freedom.‖).
12. Id. s. 165(5).
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Constitution, and there is no aspect of law and government that is not
affected by it.13 This means, as the Constitutional Court has held, that
―the legislature and executive in every sphere [of government] are
constrained by the principle that they may exercise no power and
perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law.‖14 All
law, including the common law, must be developed and legislation
must be interpreted to promote the spirit of the bill of rights,15 the
core values of which are declared to be human dignity, equality, and
freedom. As the Constitutional Court has said, ―[n]o-one could miss
the significance of the hermeneutic standard set. The values urged
upon the Court are not those that have informed our past. Our history
is one of repression not freedom, oligarchy not democracy, apartheid
and prejudice not equality, clandestine not open government.‖16
How the Courts Have Applied the Constitution
When the Constitution was adopted, effect could be given to its
founding values only if fundamental changes were made to the
political, social, and economic conditions that previously existed in
our country. This has been emphasised by the Constitutional Court
on more than one occasion. It has emphasised that ―a commitment
to . . . transform our society into one in which there will be human
dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of the new
constitutional order.‖17 This commitment to transformation is key to
understanding our Constitution and its interpretation. The Constitution provides the framework within which the transformation is to
be carried out. The Preamble, the founding values, and the Bill of
Rights that gives effect to them, articulate the goals to be achieved.
As the Constitutional Court has said, ―the process of interpreting the
Constitution must recognise the context in which we find ourselves
and the Constitution’s goal of a society based on democratic values,
social justice and fundamental human rights. This spirit of transition
and transformation characterizes the constitutional enterprise as a

13. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n, (2) SA 674 para. 44.
14. Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd. v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metro. Council,
1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para. 58 (S. Afr.).
15. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 39(2).
16. State v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para. 322 (S. Afr.).
17. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) para. 8 (S.
Afr.).
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whole.‖18
Socio-Economic Rights
The Universal Declaration recalls that ―[t]he United Nations have
in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of
men and women and have determined to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom.‖19 There is no dignity in
being compelled to live in conditions of abject poverty without access
to basic necessities of life such as food, water, health services, and
housing. Under our Constitution the government is obliged to
address such needs. The Constitution provides that everyone has the
right to have access to housing, health care, food, water, and social
security.20 It requires the state to take reasonable legislative and other
measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive
realisation of these rights.21 It also deals with land reform22 and
access to education.23
The socio-economic rights give effect to the constitutional value of
human dignity, and this influences the approach of the Court to
claims for the enforcement of such rights. Dealing with a claim for
access to housing, the Constitutional Court held that:
Reasonableness must . . . be understood in the context of
the Bill of Rights as a whole. The right of access to adequate
housing is entrenched because we value human beings and
want to ensure that they are afforded their basic needs. A
society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are
provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity,
freedom and equality.24
The State is required by the Constitution to ―respect, protect,
promote and fulfil‖ rights contained in the Bill of Rights.25 The
justiciability of socio-economic rights is therefore not an issue in
18. Investigating Directorate: Serious Econ. Offences v Hyundai Motor Distrib. 2001 (1)
SA 545 (CC) para. 21 (S. Afr.).
19. UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl.
20. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ss. 26–27.
21. Id. ss. 26(2), 27(2).
22. Id. s. 25(5).
23. Id. s. 29(1).
24. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para. 44 (S. Afr.).
25. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 7(2).
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South Africa. The question, as the Court has said, is thus ―not
whether socio-economic rights are justiciable under our Constitution,
but how to enforce them in a given case. This is a very difficult issue
which must be carefully explored on a case by case basis.‖26 In
addressing this issue, arguments about institutional competence and
the role of courts in a democracy come to the fore, not in the context
of justiciability, but in the context of how courts should deal with
claims that positive action be taken by the state to fulfill its
constitutional obligations.
Such claims are at the border of the separation of powers between
the judiciary and the executive. A balance must be struck between
the role of the court as interpreter and upholder of the Constitution,
and the role of government in a democratic society as policymaker
and lawmaker. That is not easily done. Inevitably, claims for the
enforcement of socio-economic rights are hard cases. They are hard,
not only because they draw courts into policy matters, including
possibly the budget itself, but because of the abject living conditions
of many people in our country and their legitimate demands that this
be addressed now that apartheid is over.
Positive claims for socio-economic rights are therefore approached
carefully, on a case by case basis, bearing in mind that, as the
Constitutional Court has said:
courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wideranging factual and political enquiries necessary for . . .
deciding how public revenues should most effectively be
spent. . . . [and] are ill suited to adjudicate upon issues where
court orders could have multiple social and economic consequences for the community. The Constitution contemplates
rather a restrained and focused role for the courts, namely, to
require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional
obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures
to evaluation. Such determinations of reasonableness may in
fact have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves
directed to rearranging budgets. In this way the judicial,
legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate
constitutional balance.27

26. Grootboom, (1) SA 46 para. 44.
27. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) paras. 37–38
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On the other hand, the Court has insisted that such rights are
justiciable and subject to evaluation to determine whether or not
government action (or inaction) is consistent with the standards
prescribed by the Constitution. In doing so it has rejected arguments
by the government that the making of policy is its prerogative, and
that courts cannot make orders that would have the effect of requiring
government not to pursue a particular policy, saying:
Where state policy is challenged as inconsistent with the
Constitution, courts have to consider whether in formulating
and implementing such policy the state has given effect to its
constitutional obligations. If it should hold in any given case
that the state has failed to do so, it is obliged by the Constitution to say so. In so far as that constitutes an intrusion into
the domain of the executive, that is an intrusion mandated by
the Constitution itself.28
The state has to manage its limited resources in order to address
the extensive needs of millions of people for access to a multiplicity
of social goods such as health, housing, food and water, employment
opportunities, social security, and the other socio-economic rights
entrenched in the Constitution. What the state does in one sphere
may affect its ability to deal with needs in other spheres. There will
thus be times ―when this requires [the state] to adopt an holistic
approach to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on the
specific needs of particular individuals.‖29 Where the lack of human
or financial resources is put in issue by the state, more than a ―bald
assertion‖ of resource constraints will be required.
Details of the precise character of the resource constraints,
whether human or financial, in the context of the overall
resourcing of the organ of state will need to be provided. The
standard of reasonableness so understood conforms to the
constitutional principle of accountability, on the one hand, in
that it requires decision-makers to disclose their reasons for
their conduct, and the principle of effectiveness on the other,
for it does not unduly hamper the decision-maker’s authority

(S. Afr.); see also Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd. t/a Metrorail 2005 (2) SA
359 (CC) para. 86 (S. Afr.).
28. Treatment Action Campaign, (5) SA 721 para. 99.
29. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) para. 31
(S. Afr.).
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to determine what are reasonable and appropriate measures in
the overall context of their activities.30
The Court has established a framework for dealing with such
claims built around three principles.
First, socio-economic rights are justiciable and if claims are
brought before the courts, then it is their duty to consider whether or
not the State has complied with its obligations under the Constitution.
In subjecting the measures taken by the State to constitutional review,
all aspects of the state’s performance, including policy, if that be
relevant to the decision, must be taken into account.
Second, the standard of review to be applied is whether, in the
light of the provisions of the Constitution and the State’s available
resources, the measures taken by the State can be said to be
reasonable. Policies and programs must be reasonable ―both in their
conception and their implementation.‖31 Reasonableness is a legal
principle which our courts are required to apply when there is a
challenge to the validity of administrative action of the executive.
Although the context is different, similar techniques to those applied
in administrative law have been adopted to give effect to the
constitutional requirement that measures taken must be reasonable.
Reasonableness in this context requires an appropriate balance to be
struck ―between the need to ensure that constitutional obligations are
met, on the one hand, and recognition for the fact that the bearers of
those obligations should be given appropriate leeway to determine
the best way to meet the obligations in all the circumstances.‖32 It
will therefore not
enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures
could have been adopted, or whether public money could have
been better spent . . . . [A] wide range of possible measures
could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations. Many of
these would meet the requirement of reasonableness. Once it
is shown that the measures do so, this requirement is met.33
And finally, courts must deal with such matters in a restrained and
focused manner, with due regard to their limited institutional
30. Metrorail, (2) SA 359 para. 88. For an example of a case where this was done, see
Soobramoney, (1) SA 765.
31. Grootboom, (1) SA 46 para. 42.
32. Metrorail, (2) SA 359 para. 87.
33. Grootboom, (1) SA 46 para. 41.
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capacity, and the multiple social and economic consequences which
may result from the Court’s order. I should add that these consequences would, of course, include not only those flowing from a
decision to uphold a claim, but also from a decision not to do so.
There is no time to examine the specific facts of particular cases in
any detail. In applying these principles, the Constitutional Court has
held that a national protocol setting priorities for the use of dialysis
machines in public hospitals was reasonable;34 but it has held to be
unreasonable the housing policy of a municipality which failed to
make adequate provision for access to housing by homeless people,35
the policy of the national government in failing to permit doctors in
public hospitals and clinics to prescribe an inexpensive antiretroviral
drug to combat the mother-to-child transmission of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus,36 and social welfare legislation which
excluded permanent residents from its provisions.37 Its decisions in
these cases have had far-reaching implications in eviction cases,
particularly where the applicant is an organ of the state, in bringing
about changes to the state’s policy to address the scourge of AIDS,
and in cases involving other positive obligations imposed on the state
by the Constitution or legislation.38
What the South African experience shows is that it is possible, as
Professor Sunstein has noted, to assess claims of constitutional
violations of socio-economic rights without requiring at the same
time more than existing resources will allow.39 He suggests that the
approach adopted by the South African courts ―[e]nsures respect for
sensible priority setting, and close attention to particular needs,
without displacing democratic judgments about how to set priorities.‖40 In so doing, the South African model provides an answer to
those who contend that socio-economic rights are not justiciable. It
also enables ―[t]hose whose needs are the most urgent and whose
ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril‖41 to turn to the
34. Soobramoney, (1) SA 765.
35. Grootboom, (1) SA 46.
36. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).
37. Khosa v Minister of Soc. Dev. 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S.Afr.).
38. See, e.g., Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd. t/a Metrorail 2005 (2) SA
359 (CC) (S. Afr.); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC)
(S. Afr.); Jaftha v Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.).
39. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 236 (2001).
40. Id. at 227–29.
41. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para. 44 (S. Afr.).
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courts if their needs are neglected. That is an important safeguard
and one that deserves constitutional protection.
Equality
There are many different forms of inequality that influence the
lives of people: inequality of income; inequality of capacity due to
lack of access to land, housing, education, health care, or other
necessities of life; inequality due to social exclusion because of
stereotypical attitudes or prejudices; and inequality because of
benefits accorded to others on account of patronage, favoritism, or
corruption. There is no end to the possible examples.
The Constitution provides in conventional terms that ―everyone is
equal before the law and entitled to the equal benefit and protection
of the law.‖42 Linked to the equal protection clause is a clause
prohibiting discrimination. Given the history of inequality in South
Africa, a formal application of equality and anti-discrimination
clauses might have entrenched existing patterns of privilege and
hampered the achievement of the constitutional goal of transformation. This was a particular risk in a country like ours with its long
history of institutionalized discrimination.
The drafters of our Constitution knew about the evolving
principles of equality law in other countries. They were acutely
aware of the disputes in the United States over the interpretation and
application of the 14th Amendment and, in particular, of the litigation
here concerning affirmative action. To avoid such disputes in South
Africa, and to ensure that equality is given a substantive and not
merely a formal meaning, the Constitution also provides: ―[e]quality
includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures
designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.‖43
Consistent with this, the anti-discrimination clause targets ―unfair
discrimination,‖ providing that: ―[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds,
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age disability, religion, conscience,

42. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 9(1).
43. Id. s. 9(2).
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belief culture, language and birth.‖44 The prohibition against unfair
discrimination is then extended to all persons and it is provided that
national legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair
discrimination.45 This ensures that the prohibition of unfair discrimination extends to the exercise of private power as well as public
power. Such legislation has been enacted.
The Constitutional Court construes the equality clauses as calling
for a substantive rather than a formal approach to equality, saying
that the Constitution ―[h]eralds not only equal protection of the law
and non-discrimination but also the start of a credible and abiding
process of reparation for past exclusion, dispossession and indignity
within the discipline of our constitutional framework.‖46 And further,
that ―decades of systematic racial discrimination entrenched by the
apartheid legal order cannot be eliminated without positive action
being taken to achieve that result.‖47
It follows that some of the debates that have taken place around
affirmative action in the context of equal protection clauses in the
United States of America may not arise in South Africa and the
decisions of our Courts on equality issues may well differ from
decisions of the United States courts on similar issues. In a modern
society it is impossible for government to perform its regulatory role
without making regulations that differentiate between people.
Discrimination, therefore, means something more than mere
differentiation. In common parlance it has a pejorative content
implying that the person or persons concerned have been prejudiced
by unfavorable treatment. The constitutional standard of unfair
discrimination requires also that a judgment be made concerning the
fairness or unfairness of the particular differentiation. In an early
judgment on the issue of discrimination, the Constitutional Court
said:
Given the history of this country, we are of the view that
―discrimination‖ has acquired a particular pejorative meaning
relating to the unequal treatment of people based on attributes
and characteristics attaching to them. We are emerging from a

44. Id. s. 9(3).
45. Id. s. 9(4).
46. Minister of Finance v van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) para. 25 (S. Afr.).
47. Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para.
74 (S. Afr.).

3 CHASKALSON SPEECH (DO NOT DELETE)

38

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

4/29/2009 11:34 AM

[Vol. 24:24

period of our history during which the humanity of the
majority of the inhabitants of this country was denied. They
were treated as not having inherent worth; as objects whose
identities could be arbitrarily defined by those in power rather
than as persons of infinite worth. In short, they were denied
recognition of their inherent dignity.48
The phrase ―unfair discrimination‖ should therefore be understood,
said the Court, as denoting differential treatment which impairs the
fundamental dignity of the persons affected or impacts on them in a
comparably serious manner.49
The fundamental dignity referred to is not a narrow criterion; it is a
dignity that respects a community in which all are equal members
entitled to equal concern and respect. The impact of the discrimination on the complainant is what is crucial. It is not enough for a
complainant to show that he or she was subjected to unequal
treatment unless it resulted in prejudice of such a nature.
This calls for a nuanced and comprehensive enquiry in which all
relevant factors must be assessed ―cumulatively and objectively.‖50
Factors relevant to the inquiry into unfairness include a consideration
of the extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights or
interests of complainants; the more invasive the discrimination to the
interests of those affected by it, the more likely it will be held to be
unfair. The position of the complainants in society and whether they
suffered in the past from patterns of disadvantage are relevant. The
more vulnerable the group, the more likely it is that discrimination
will be unfair.51 The nature of the provision and the aims it seeks to
achieve are also relevant; legislation or conduct is less likely to be
held unfair if its purpose is directed to achieving equality.52
It is not possible here to catalogue the decisions of our courts to
show how they are approaching their task of translating human rights
into practice. I have said enough to show how they have given effect
to issues of dignity and equality, the core values of the Universal

48. Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) para. 31 (S. Afr.).
49. Id. para. 33.
50. National Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1
(CC) para. 41 (S. Afr.).
51. See City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) para. 44 (S. Afr.);
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para. 112 (S. Afr.).
52. See National Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal., (2) SA 1 para. 41.
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Declaration.
What our courts are doing must be seen in light of the circumstances of our country, of our constitution, and of our history.
Though institutional racial discrimination no longer exists, and much
has changed for the better, there is still widespread poverty,
landlessness and unemployment, and great disparities between rich
and poor. I believe in our country and its future; but, it must be
acknowledged that despite the commitments made in our Constitution, we have a long way to go to realize the aspirations of the
Universal Declaration.

